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Abstract
WhatsApp is a widely adopted mobile messaging application with over 800 million users. Recently, a calling feature was
added to the application and no comprehensive digital forensic analysis has been performed with regards to this feature
at the time of writing this paper. In this work, we describe how we were able to decrypt the network traffic and obtain
forensic artifacts that relate to this new calling feature which included the: a) WhatsApp phone numbers, b) Whats-
App server IPs, c) WhatsApp audio codec (Opus), d) WhatsApp call duration, and e) WhatsApp’s call termination.
We explain the methods and tools used to decrypt the traffic as well as thoroughly elaborate on our findings with
respect to the WhatsApp signaling messages. Furthermore, we also provide the community with a tool that helps in the
visualization of the WhatsApp protocol messages.
Keywords: WhatsApp, reverse engineering, proprietary protocol, signaling protocols, network forensics, decryption,
mobile forensics, digital forensics, cyber security, audio encoding
1. Introduction
WhatsApp is one of the most widely used personal-
messaging mobile applications for free texting and content
sharing (namely audio, video, images, location and con-
tacts), boasting over 800 million users worldwide and was
bought by facebook in 2014 for $19 Billion1. The calling
feature was added recently in version 2.11.552, which was
released 2015-03-05 (Arce, 2015).
From its wide adoption, it is obvious how WhastApp
communication exchanges may be used during an inves-
tigation, making the artifacts it produces of compelling
forensic relevance. Therefore, we see a strong necessity
for both researchers and practitioners to gain a compre-
hensive understanding of the networking protocol used in
WhatsApp, as well as the type of forensically relevant data
it contains. Most importantly, due to the newly intro-
duced calling feature, it becomes essential to understand
the signaling messages used in the establishment of calls
between the WhatsApp clients and servers. The methods
and tools used in this research could be relvant to inves-
tigations where proving that a call was made at a certain
date and time is necessary.
Email addresses: xkarpi03@stud.fit.vutbr.cz (F. Karpisek),
IBaggili@newhaven.edu (I. Baggili), FBreitinger@newhaven.edu
(F. Breitinger)
URL: http://www.unhcfreg.com/ (I. Baggili),
http://www.FBreitinger.de/ (F. Breitinger)
1http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/19/technology/social/
facebook-whatsapp/, last accessed 2015-07-03.
Our contribution outlines the WhatsApp messaging pro-
tocol from a networking perspective and provides a solu-
tion to explore and study WhatsApp network communi-
cations. In terms of novelty, to our knowledge, this is the
first paper that discusses the WhatsApp signaling mes-
sages used when establishing voice calls. The work has
impact on practitioners in the field that have obtained
network traffic for a potential suspect, as well as providing
scientists literature for better understanding the network
protocol itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we review existing work, while Section 3 describes the
WhatsApp protocol. Then, in Section 4 we describe the
tool we created for visualizing exchanged WhatsApp mes-
sages. In Section 6, we describe the process of obtaining
decrypted connections between the WhatsApp client and
the WhatsApp server. Then in Section 7 we examine the
message contents and discuss the meaning of the signal-
ing messages during a WhatsApp call. Finally, in Section
8, we offer concluding remarks and outline some future
research.
2. Related work
There has been research conducted on the forensics of
WhatsApp but the majority of that work focused on the
data that WhatsApp stores on the mobile device when
compared to our work which focuses on the network foren-
sics of WhatsApp.
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2.1. Network protocol forensics
At the time of writing this paper, the work on network
protocol forensics of WhatsApp was sparse. The only work
that provided any detail on WhatsApp’s networking pro-
tocol was the Hancke (2015) report. Hancke (2015)’s work
focused more on Realtime Transport Protocol (RTP) me-
dia streams (Schulzrinne et al., 2003). The report fails to
uncover the call signaling messages used by WhatsApp,
which is elaborated on by our work.
2.2. Mobile device forensics
Anglano (2014) performed an in-depth analysis of
WhatsApp on Android devices. The work provided a com-
prehensive description of the artifacts generated by Whats-
App and discussed the decoding, interpretation and rela-
tionship between the artifacts. Anglano (2014) was able
to provide an analyst with the means of reconstructing the
list of contacts and chronology of the messages that have
been exchanged by users.
The works by Thakur (2013) and Mahajan et al. (2013)
are similar to previous studies since they both focused
on the forensic analysis of WhatsApp on Android. These
studies uncovered the forensic acquisition of the artifacts
left by WhatsApp on the device. Thakur (2013) focused
on the forensic analysis of WhatsApp artifacts on an An-
droid phone’s storage and volatile memory. The results
showed that one is able to obtain many artifacts such as
phone numbers, messages, media files, locations, profile
pictures, logs and more. Mahajan et al. (2013) analyzed
WhatsApp and Viber artifacts using the Cellebrite Foren-
sic Extraction Device (UFED) toolkit. They were able to
recover contact lists, exchanged messages and media in-
cluding their timestamps and call details.
Walnycky et al. (2015) examined 20 different popular
mobile social-messaging applications for Android including
WhatsApp. In their work, they focused on unencrypted
traffic that could be easily reconstructed. WhatsApp was
found to be favorable at encrypting its network traffic
when compared to other mobile social-messaging applica-
tions. Therefore, based on the primarily findings by Wal-
nycky et al. (2015), our study aimed at further investigat-
ing and dissecting the WhatsApp protocol, and in specific,
focusing on the signaling messages used when establishing
WhatsApp calls given this new feature. However, in order
to dive deeper into the signaling messages, one must un-
derstand some known attributes of the WhatsApp protocol
which we discuss in Section 3 below.
3. WhatsApp protocol
WhatsApp uses the FunXMPP protocol for message ex-
change which is a binary-efficient encoded Extensible Mes-
saging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) (WHAnonymous,
2015c). The WhatsApp protocol is also briefly described
by LowLevel-Studios (2012) from an implementation per-
spective. To fully describe the FunXMPP protocol is be-
yond this paper’s scope. For more information on the pro-
tocol the readers may want visit a website outlining the
protocol2.
3.1. Authentication procedure
There are two types of authentication procedures the
WhatsApp client can use when connecting to the servers.
If it is the first time the client is connecting to the server,
a full handshake is performed as illustrated in Figure 1.
Subsequently, for any consecutive connections, only a half
handshake is executed using data provided from the initial
full handshake.
We note that a half handshake therefore results in using
the same session keys multiple times, which can be deemed
as a plausible protocol security weakness.
3.1.1. Full handshake
The authentication procedure as described by the devel-
opers of WhatsAPI consists of three messages (WHAnony-
mous, 2015a). This is synonymous with the well known
three-way handshake and is described in detail in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. These messages can be observed in
Figure 1 which was created using our developed tool (for
more details see Section 4).
As shown in Figure 1, first, the client sends an <auth>
message to the server. This message is not encrypted and
contains the client number and authentication method the
client wants to use.
Then, the server replies with a <challenge> message
containing a 20 byte long nonce for the session key genera-
tion. Session keys are then generated using the Password-
Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) algorithm
using the password as a passphrase and the nonce as a
salt. Both the server and the client know the password
and nonce so the generated keys are the same on both
ends. Four keys are generated in total: two keys for confi-
dentiality (one for each direction - from the server and to
server) and two keys for the integrity check (again one for
each direction).
The client then creates a <response> message that
consists of a concatenated client phone number in ASCII,
nonce sent by the server in binary, current Unix times-
tamp in ASCII and other device description data. This
message is encrypted using the generated session keys and
it is prepended by the hash of the message for integrity
checking purposes. Decrypted contents of the response
message are illustrated in Figure 2, where we can see the
aformentioned fields – their hexadecimal value and also
the ASCII representation as displayed by Wireshark.
If registration is successful, the server replies with a
<success> message that is encrypted. Otherwise, the
2https://github.com/WHAnonymous/Chat-API/wiki/FunXMPP-
Protocol, last accessed 2015-07-03.
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Figure 1: Full handshake between WhatsApp client and server.
Note: Numbers on the left side represent packet numbers (see Appendix A for the source pcap file). Also, there can be multiple messages in one
packet.
Figure 2: Content of <response> message with marked regions
server replies with a <failure> message that is not en-
crypted.
3.1.2. Half handshake
A half handshake consists only of an <auth> message
that already contains the data of a <response> message
described above, and the server’s reply, a <success> mes-
sage. The client uses the nonce from the earlier session
which means that this nonce is not known by outsiders,
therefore, it is not possible to decrypt such a session, as
session encryption keys cannot be determined.
4. Tool for visualizing WhatsApp protocol mes-
sages
4.1. Description
Our tool is a command-line program written in Python
(version 2.7). It is named convertPDML.py as it converts
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the PDML ﬁle exported from Wireshark to an HTML re-
port. It is available in the form of source code, see Ap-
pendix A for more details. It requires one input parameter;
a path to an XML ﬁle containing the details of dissected
packets. See the step 5 in Section 6.3 for details on how
to create the XML ﬁle.
The output of the tool is a report ﬁle containing all the
messages exchanged between the WhatsApp client and the
WhatsApp servers in HTML format as shown in Figure 1.
Hence, any standard browser can be used to view the re-
sults. Messages are ordered chronologically as they appear
in the input XML ﬁle.
4.2. Usage
As mentioned above, the tool requires am XML ﬁle as
an input parameter. Example:
convertPDML.py INPUT.xml
5. Network traﬃc collection
This section explains how we collected the WhatsApp
network traﬃc. More details are presented in Sections 5.1
and 5.2.
5.1. Experimental setup
We used the setup exempliﬁed in Figure 3 for capturing
network traﬃc between the WhatsApp messenger running
on an Android phone and the WhatsApp servers. The
hardware and software used in the experimental setup are
listed below:
Figure 3: Experimental setup
Equipment used in experimental setup:
• Phone: Lenovo P780, Android 4.2.1, running
– Whatsapp v2.12.84 which was downloaded from
the Google play store.
– Password Extractor v1.03.
3https://www.mgp25.com/downloads/pw.apk, last accessed 2015-
07-06
• Laptop: Lenovo ThinkPad T420s with Windows 7 64-
bit with the following installed software:
– Wireshark v1.12.5, 32-bit, with the WhatsApp
dissector 4.
– Pidgin v2.12.115, 32-bit, with the WhatsApp
plugin 6.
5.2. High level methodology
First, we disconnected the Android phone from any In-
ternet connection and used the Password Exctractor appli-
cation to gain access to the WhatsApp password. We note
that the phone had to be rooted to use this application.
We would also like to mention that there could have been
multiple ways to gain access to the password on the de-
vice such as using commercially available tools to acquire
a forensic image of the phone, and in some cases gaining
access to the password can be achieved without rooting
the phone if the acquistion method allows the investigator
to acquire the image without rooting the device.
We then utilized Pidgin messenger with the WhatsApp
plugin and obtained the WhatsApp password for connect-
ing to the WhatsApp servers in order to desynchronize the
WhatsApp client installed on the Android phone. This was
performed in order for us to capture the full handshake (see
Section 3.1.1 for more details).
The next step included setting up a wiﬁ access point
(see Figure 3) on the laptop and sharing the Internet con-
nection from the ethernet port to the wiﬁ adapter. The
laptop now acted as a wiﬁ router. We then started captur-
ing all the traﬃc on the access point’s network. In the next
step, we connected the phone to the created wiﬁ network
and made a WhatsApp call to a user with phone number
1-203-xxx-xxxx. Finally, we ﬁnished capturing the traﬃc
and saved the created pcap ﬁle.
Following the aforementioned methodology allowed us
to collect network traﬃc enabling us to perform ex-
ploratory analysis. In the following Section 6, we outline
the resultant steps that we were able to reproduce for de-
crypting the WhatsApp messaging traﬃc.
6. Decryption
According to LowLevel-Studios (2012) and WHAnony-
mous (2015a) , encryption and decryption in WhatsApp
is performed with a symmetric RC4 stream cipher using
keys generated during authentication which is described in
the Section 3.1.
Therefore, in order to decrypt the communication be-
tween the WhatsApp servers and the WhatsApp client,
session keys for each direction (as WhatsApp uses one key
4https://davidgf.net/page/37/whatsapp-dissector-for-
wireshark, last accessed 2015-07-06
5https://pidgin.im/, last accessed 2015-07-06
6https://davidgf.net/whatsapp/, last accessed 2015-07-06
4
for communication from device to the server and a different
one for communication from the server to the device) are
required. The process of obtaining these keys is provided
in the Section 3.1.1.
6.1. Prerequisites
Our work showed that there are two mandatory require-
ments for the successful decryption of WhatsApp messag-
ing connections:
• The password associated with the WhatsApp account.
• The record of the full handshake between the Whats-
App client and the server.
6.2. Tools used
We outline the list of software tools that were used in
the decryption process:
• To obtain the password, there are multiple options
based on the mobile device being used (WHAnony-
mous, 2015b). As we were using an already rooted
Android phone, the easiest way was to extract pass-
word using Password Extractor application.
• To force WhatsApp to establish a full handshake the
next time mobile device connected to the server, it
was necessary to break the synchronization between
the WhatsApp client and the server. The simplest
way for doing that was to connect using a different
client. For that purpose, we used the IM client Pidgin
alongside the WhatsApp plugin.
• To decrypt the WhatsApp connection between the
client and server, we used Wireshark and a Whats-
App-specific dissector.
• To visualize the WhatsApp protocol message ex-
change we created a command-line tool described in
Section 4.
6.3. Decryption procedure
In this section, we elaborate using a step-by-step proce-
dure describing how to successfully decrypt and visualize
the exchange of WhatsApp protocol’s messages between
the WhatsApp client and the servers.
1. As the Android phone we were using, was rooted,
obtaining the password was as easy as installing
and running an application mentioned in the Section
6.2. In our case, the username (phone number) was
420xxxxxxxxx with the following extracted password
627XlMqch8i5Ncy2tRSbZLXs2m0=.
2. After obtaining credentials for the WhatsApp account
(phone number and password), we disconnected the
mobile device running WhatsApp from the wifi net-
work and used the IM client Pidgin with the Whats-
App plugin and used the obtained credentials to log
in to our WhatsApp account. This broke the synchro-
nization between the WhatsApp client on the mobile
device and the WhatsApp server forcing the client to
authenticate using a full handshake.
3. We then connected the mobile device running the
WhatsApp client back to the wifi access point captur-
ing all the communication from and to the mobile de-
vice as explained in Section 5.1. After the WhatsApp
client logged into the WhatsApp account, we placed a
WhatsApp call to another device. All recorded com-
munication was saved to a pcap file. Access to the
pcap file is presented in the Appendix A.
4. After we captured all the communication between the
WhatsApp client and the WhatsApp server, we pro-
vided the WhatsApp dissector in Wireshark with the
credentials we obtained in the prior steps. To do that
we used Wireshark’s menu Edit -> Preferences
and in the Protocols section we set up the Whats-
App dissector with the same options exemplified in
Figure 4.
After setting up the WhatsApp dissector correctly, we
were able to observe the content of encrypted mes-
sages and the content of the <response> message
should start with the number used in <auth> mes-
sage as shown in Figure 2.
5. When the communication was decrypted we ex-
ported it to XML format using Wireshark’s func-
tion File -> Export Packet Dissections -> as
XML - "PDML" (packet details) file.... We
provide access to this XML file in the Appendix A.
Part of this XML file (namely <auth> is illusrated
in Listing 1 where we can see the same values as in
<auth> message from Figure 1 – attribute user
with value 420xxxxxxxxx (lines 33-38) and attribute
mechanism with value WAUTH-2 (lines 39-44).
6. The final step involved using our tool to generate a
report of the WhatsApp message exchange between
the WhatsApp client and WhatsApp servers. For that
we used the XML file generated in the previous step.
For more details refer to the Section 4 for details.
7. Findings
In the following subsections, we describe our findings
on the signaling messages used for call establishment in
WhatsApp. For a visual representation of our findings
readers may want to refer to Figure 5.
7.1. Protocol analysis of call signaling messages
In this section we elaborate on messages that we hypoth-
esize are part of the establishment a WhatsApp call as we
observed it in the decrypted captured communication traf-
fic. We used the captured pcap file and the HTML report
generated from the same pcap file (refer to the Section 6.3
for more details). Both of these files can be downloaded
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1 <packet >
2 <proto name="geninfo" pos="0" showname="General information" size="239">
3 <!-- omitted --> </proto >
4 <proto name="frame" showname="Frame 8: 239 bytes on wire (1912 bits), 239 bytes captured
5 (1912 bits)" size="239" pos="0">
6 <!-- omitted --> </proto >
7 <proto name="eth" showname="Ethernet II, Src: LenovoMo_62:f0:0c (c8:dd:c9:62:f0:0c),
8 Dst: IntelCor_6a :38:85 (10:0b:a9:6a:38:85)" size="14" pos="0">
9 <!-- omitted --> </proto >
10 <proto name="ip" showname="Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.137.208 (192.168.137.208) ,
11 Dst: 174.37.231.87 (174.37.231.87)" size="20" pos="14"> <!-- omitted --> </proto >
12 <proto name="tcp" showname="Transmission Control Protocol , Src Port: 44863 (44863) ,
13 Dst Port: xmpp -client (5222) , Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 173" size="32"pos="34">
14 <!-- omitted --> </proto >
15 <proto name="whatsapp" showname="WhatsApp XMPP protocol" size="173" pos="66">
16 <field name="whatsapp.message" showname="Message" size="26" pos="70" show="" value="">
17 <!-- omitted --> </field >
18 <field name="whatsapp.message" showname="Message" size="28" pos="96" show="" value="">
19 <!-- omitted --> </field >
20 <field name="whatsapp.message" showname="Message" size="115" pos="124" show="" value="">
21 <field name="whatsapp.message" showname="Message size: 112" size="2" pos="125" show="112"
22 value="0070"/>
23 <field name="whatsapp.flags" showname="Flags: 0x00" size="1" pos="124" show="0" value="00">
24 <field name="whatsapp.crypted" showname="0... .... = Crypted: False" size="1" pos="124"
25 show="0" value="0" unmaskedvalue="00"/>
26 <field name="whatsapp.compressed" showname=".0.. .... = Compressed: False" size="1" pos="124"
27 show="0" value="0" unmaskedvalue="00"/>
28 </field>
29 <field name="whatsapp.node" showname="Node" size="112" pos="127" show="" value="">
30 <field name="whatsapp.node" showname="Size: 6" size="1" pos="128" show="6" value="06"/>
31 <field name="whatsapp.keyenc15" showname="Key: auth (12)" size="1" pos="129" show="12"
32 value="0c"/>
33 <field name="whatsapp.attr" showname="Attribute" size="9" pos="130" show="" value="">
34 <field name="whatsapp.keyenc15" showname="Key: user (181)" size="1" pos="130" show="181"
35 value="b5"/>
36 <field name="whatsapp.nibbleencoded15" showname="Nibble encoded number (420 xxxxxxxxx)"
37 size="8" pos="131" show="" value=""/>
38 </field>
39 <field name="whatsapp.attr" showname="Attribute" size="2" pos="139" show="" value="">
40 <field name="whatsapp.keyenc15" showname="Key: mechanism (86)" size="1" pos="139" show="86"
41 value="56"/>
42 <field name="whatsapp.valueenc15" showname="Value: WAUTH -2 (191)" size="1" pos="140"
43 show="191" value="bf"/>
44 </field>
45 <field name="whatsapp.nodevalueplain" showname="Value [truncated ]:
46 E\0319\357\277\275}n&lt ;\357\277\275\357\277\27537x\357\277\275d\031k\357\277\2756 BQu \020
47 \357\277\275\357\277\275A\357\277\275[\357\277\275\357\277\275\035\357\277\275\357\277\275=
48 \357\277\275\ a8 \357\277\275\001 na \357\277" size="96" pos="143" show="E\x199\xef\xbf
49 \xbd}n&lt;\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd37x\xef\xbf\xbdd\x19k\xef\xbf\xbd6BQu\x10\xef\xbf\xbd\xef
50 \xbf\xbdA\xef\xbf\xbd[\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\x1d\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd=\xef\xbf\xbd\x78
51 \xef\xbf\xbd\x1na\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbdu/\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\x4x\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf
52 \xbd\x16\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbdB\xef\xbf
53 \xbdvF\xef\xbf\xbd!D\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd\x2\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd1Em #\xef
54 \xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbdIO\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbdX\xef\xbf\xbd\xef\xbf\xbd#\x10$S"
55 value="451939 a37d6e3cedd5333778a264196ba53642517510aba141a75befdf1dd0963dd70738aa016e6120b1
56 bb752f83f70478c9db16f3f9c8ecf3e942ab7646a12144eddba10298c631456d23f7e5494fecf658988b2310245
57 3002657366 a36ae80"/>
58 </field>
59 </field>
60 </proto>
61 </packet >
Listing 1: Packet 8 containing WhatsApp <auth> message exported from Wireshark in XML format
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Figure 4: WhatsApp Wireshark dissector settings
from Appendix A. In the rest of this section, we refer to
the packet numbers displayed on the leftmost side in the
flow diagram of signaling message exchange in Figure 5.
First (in packets [8]-[32]), the WhatsApp client con-
nects and authenticates with the first WhatsApp server
174.37.231.87 but there is no activity regarding a call.
Starting with packet [33], the WhatsApp client con-
nects and authenticates to a second WhatsApp server
174.36.210.45 and starts placing a call.
Right after connecting to the second server, in packet
[41], the client asks for the presence of the called party
(phone number 1-203-xxx-xxxx ) and starts the call es-
tablishment process by sending <offer> message to the
called party. This happens in packet [42]. There we can
observe the property call-id="1431719979-2" for the
first time. This property remains constant throughout the
rest of the signaling messages during the whole signaling
process and it identifies the call as it is unique for each call
and therefore changes every time a call is initiated.
In this first message we can also observe that the caller
is offering to use the Opus codec (Valin et al., 2012) (in
property <audio>) for voice data in two sampling rates,
8kHz and 16kHz. We also observe the properties <p2p>
(value of 16 bytes = 128 bits) and <srtp> (192 bytes
= 1536 bits) values which we were not able to decode.
We postulate that they might be some kind of initializa-
tion vectors for encryption of media streams and/or de-
scription of these streams. The last property is <te>
contains a 6 byte value that we decoded as the end-
point (IP address and port) where the client announces
the endpoint address for the media stream. Its value is
192.168.137.208:46416.
The server replies with <ack relay> in packet [43]
which contains property <token> (value of 204 bytes =
1632 bits) which we were also unable to decode, multiple
properties <te> that announce endpoint addresses of re-
lay servers (8 servers in total), and properties <encode>,
<agc> (gain control) and <ns> (noise suppression) that
we hypothesize further specify media encoding.
Packets [44] and [45] carry messages <receipt> and
<ack> of the receipt. To the best of our knowledge, these
messages do not contain any data of interest.
Packet [46] going from the server to the client carries the
message <preaccept> and has the property <audio>
that asserts that the used codec for media streams will be
the Opus codec at the sampling rate of 16kHz. It also
contains the property <srtp> that has the same length
as the same <srtp> property in packet [42] (192 bytes
= 1536 bits) but carries different value.
Packet [47] carries the message <transport> which
contains the client’s endpoint address but from an ex-
ternal point of view - a public endpoint address. This
address is found out by the client using Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN) mechanism (Mahy et al.,
2010) – client asks the TURN server what is its (client’s)
IP address from the outside point of view. Its value
is 64.251.61.74:62334 which differs from the value in
packet [42] - 192.168.137.208:46416. Packet [48] car-
ries the <ack> message to the previous message.
We can observe a relay server election in packets [49]-
[65]. The client finds out latency between itself and the re-
lay servers obtained from message <relay> from packet
[43] and one of the servers is elected.
The last message of the call establishment process is
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Figure 5: Signaling messages of WhatsApp call (numbers refer to
packet numbers)
message <accept> in packet [70]. It contains the prop-
erty <audio> that confirms that used codec is Opus,
sampling rate 16kHz, properties <p2p> and <srtp>
(with the same value as in packet [47]) and two endpoint
addresses: private - 192.168.1.22:55607 and public -
64.251.61.74:55607. These endpoint addresses are used
when trying to establish a direct peer-to-peer (P2P) con-
nection. Packet [71] contains <receipt> message con-
firming the previous message.
After that, both-way media stream is established from
192.168.137.208:46416 to 31.13.74.48:3478 using
RTP. These addresses were announced in a message in
packet [42] and during the relay server election.
After about 30 seconds of the ongoing call, the client
connects to another WhatsApp server (108.168.180.110)
and signaling messages start flowing through this server.
The client then announces new endpoint addresses in pack-
ets [2688] and [2711] and after a new relay election process,
a new media stream is created replacing the previous one
using a new endpoint address.
Finally, the client connects to another WhatsApp
server (174.37.231.88) and sends two identical messages
<terminate> in packets [7921] and [7925] and the call is
terminated.
7.2. Media streams
Hancke (2015) mentioned in his report that WhatsApp
uses a codec at 16kHz sampling rate with bandwidth of
about 20kbit/s. Unlike us, Philipp Hancke did not have
access to the decrypted signaling messages and thus we
can now declare that WhatsApp is using the Opus codec
for voice media streams at either 8kHz or 16kHz sampling
rate which is decided at call setup.
We attempted to decode the media using the open-
source implementation of the Opus codec7 but the decoded
result was not voice audio. From that and from the fact
that we can observe <srtp> properties (SRTP stands
for Secure Realtime Transport Protocol (Baugher et al.,
2004)) we infer that these media streams are being en-
crypted.
7.3. Analysis summary
Through the analysis of signaling messages exchanged
during a WhatsApp call we were able to:
• Closely examine the authentication process of Whats-
App clients.
• Discover what codec WhatsApp is using for voice me-
dia streams - Opus at 8 or 16kHz sampling rates.
• Understand how relay servers are announced and the
relay election mechanism.
• Understand how clients announce their endpoint ad-
dresses for media streams.
Gaining insight into these signaling messages is essential
for the understanding of the WhatsApp protocol especially
in the area of WhatsApp call analysis from a forensic net-
working perspective.
7.4. Forensically relevant artifacts
As shown in Table 1, forensically relvant artifacts may
be extracted from the network traffic using the outlined
methodology. Most notably (see Figure 1), we were able
to acquire the following artifacts from the network traffic:
• WhatsApp phone numbers.
• WhatsApp phone call establishment metadata and
datetime stamps.
• WhatsApp phone call termination metadata and
datetime stamps.
7http://www.opus-codec.org/, last accessed 2015-07-06
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• WhatsApp phone call duration metadata and date-
time stamps.
• WhatsApp’s phone call voice codec (Opus)
• WhatsApp’s relay server IP addresses used during the
calls.
8. Conclusions
In this work, we decrypted the WhatsApp client con-
nection to the WhatsApp servers and visualized messages
exchanged through such a connection using a command-
line tool we created. This tool may be useful for deeper
analysis of the WhatsApp protocol.
We also uncovered the hypothesized signaling messages
of the WhatsApp call which revealed what codec is being
actually used for media transfer (Opus), as well as forensi-
cally relevant metadata about the call establishment, ter-
mination, duration and phone numbers assocaited with the
call.
9. Future work
In this work we were unable to decode media RTP
streams as they seem to be encrypted. However, we hy-
pothesize that encryption keys are most likely being trans-
fered inside the signaling messages during the set up of a
WhatsApp call and therefore we postulate that it should
be possible, in theory, to decrypt these media streams as
well. The main challenge for this task is to find out the
encryption keys and encryption algorithm used.
We would also like to note that a limitation of our work
is that it was tested on an Android device. Although we
hypothesize that the protocol used in the communication
will be constant accross platforms, recreating the exper-
iments with different devices and operating systems run-
ning WhatsApp is needed to validate that claim. Also,
we would like to note that as more features are added to
WhatsApp, more experiments need to be conducted to en-
sure that the design of the protocol does not change.
We would also like to encourage other researchers to ap-
ply the techniques explained in our work to analyze the
network traffic of other popular messaging applications so
that the forensic community can gain a better understand-
ing of the forensically relevant artifacts that may be ex-
tracted from the network traffic, and not only the data
stored on the devices.
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Appendix A. Reference files
These are files that were used throughout this paper.
These files can be provided to researchers by visiting our
website http://www.unhcfreg.com under Tools & Data.
• whatsapp register and call.pcap - pcap file con-
taining user with phone number 420xxxxxxxxx
connecting to multiple WhatsApp servers and
placing a call to the user with phone number
1-203-xxx-xxxx.
• whatsapp register and call.xml - content of pre-
vious pcap file exported from Wireshark in XML for-
mat.
• whatsapp register and call.html - HTML file that
was generated from previous XML file using our tool.
• convertPDML.py - command-line tool for convert-
ing XML files exported from Wireshark to a visual
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Table 1: Forensically relevant data, their location and sample data
Data type Location Sample data
WhatsApp password device storage /data/data/com.whatsapp/files/pw
phone numbers database files, network traffic ”user” values in <auth> messages and ”from” and
”to” values in <call> and <ack> messages:
<auth user="420xxxxxxxxx" mechanism="WAUTH-2">
<call to="1203xxxxxxx" id="1431719979-3">
<ack from="1203xxxxxxx" id="1431719979-3"
class="call" type="offer">
phone call establishment database files, network traffic timestamp of <accept> message:
<field name="timestamp" pos="0" show="May
15, 2015 23:26:48.025662000 Central Europe
Daylight Time" showname="Captured Time"
value="1431725208.025662000" size="453" />
phone call termination database files, network traffic timestamp of <terminate> message:
<field name="timestamp" pos="0" show="May
15, 2015 23:28:12.177489000 Central Europe
Daylight Time" showname="Captured Time"
value="1431725292.177489000" size="134" />
phone call duration database files, network traffic ”duration” value in <terminate> message:
<terminate call-id="1431719979-2"
duration="84000" />
phone call voice codec network traffic ”audio” value in <call> and <accept> messages:
<audio enc="opus" rate="8000" />
<audio enc="opus" rate="16000" />
relay server used during call network traffic ”te” value in <relayelection> messages:
<relayelection call-id="1431719979-2">
<te latency="-98122">
31.13.74.48:3478 (1f0d4a300d96)
</te>
</relayelection>
HTML report containing flow of WhatsApp messages
exchanged between WhatsApp Messenger and the
WhatsApp servers.
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